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Environmental legislation in the UK 
consists largely of prohibitions, which 
may be disapplied by a licensing regime. 
Non-compliance is almost invariably a 
criminal offence of strict liability, 
requiring no mens rea. This approach can 
be traced back to cases such as R v 
Stephens [1866] LR 1 QB 702 which were 
based in public nuisance, where likewise 
mens rea is not relevant. Justification was 
given by Lord Salmon in Alphacell v 
Woodward [1972] AC 824 where he said:
'The offences created by the [Rivers 
(Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951] seem to 
me to be prototypes of offences which 'are not 
criminal in any real sense, but are acts which in 
the public interest are prohibited under a 
penalty' ... If this appeal succeeded and it were 
held to be the law that no conviction could be 
obtained under the Act of 1951 unless the 
prosecution could discharge the often impossible 
onus of proving that the pollution was caused 
intentionally or negligently, a great deal of 
pollution would go unpunished and undeterred 
to the relief oj many riparian factory owners. As 
a result, many rivers which are now filthy would 
become filthier still and many rivers which are 
now clean would lose their cleanliness. The 
legislator no doubt recognised that as a matter 
of public policy this would be most unfortunate. 
Hence s. 2(I)(a) which encourages riparian 
factories not only to take reasonable steps to 
prevent pollution but to do everything 
possible to ensure that they do not cause 
it. '(my emphasis).
Strict liability is also a necessary 
element of the polluter pays principle. If 
an economic activity causes social costs, 
this principle requires the operator to 
bear those costs in full   at least in the 
absence of consent by the victims, or 
where, in the wider public interest, this is 
deemed to be made on their behalf and 
there is a licensing regime in operation. 
Considerations of intent, negligence, or
' o o '
any other blameworthiness have no place.
The European Commission in its 
green paper Remedying Environmental 
Damage specifically stated: 'strict liability 
appears to be particularly suited to the 
specific features of repairing 
environmental damage' and this view was 
supported by the report on this green 
paper by the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European 
Communities.
CRIMINAL CONTEXT
Strict liability is therefore 
appropriate to environmental 
enforcement. Nevertheless, it sits most 
uneasily in the context of the criminal 
law, not only as a matter of principle but 
also on purely practical grounds. It is 
clearly wrong in principle that a person 
can be convicted of a criminal offence in 
circumstances where he may never have 
intended the consequences of his act or 
omission, was not negligent, and indeed
' o o '
may have done his level best to avoid the 
consequences that precipitated the 
prosecution and conviction. To brand 
such a person a criminal is bound to be 
seen by most lay people at least as wholly 
unreasonable and is liable to bring the 
law and those who enforce it into 
disrepute.
If the fines were comparable to those 
for parking offences (as they used to be, 
and occasionally still are) this 
consideration would carry less weight; 
but with the magistrates now able to 
impose fines of up to £20,000 and, in 
many cases, unlimited fines and prison 
sentences available on convictions on 
indictment, the anomalous nature of 
strict liabilitv for such criminal offences
cannot be lightly disregarded.
There are also cogent practical 
grounds for this concern. To avoid
o
convicting a defendant on a criminal 
charge unfairly, he is, quite rightly, 
afforded a whole range of evidential and 
other procedural safeguards, notably the 
appreciably heavier criminal burden of 
proof. This protection inevitably means 
either that there are more acquittals than 
would otherwise be the case or   no 
doubt much more often   that 
proceedings are never brought in the first 
place. The adverse consequences for 
society at large if actions that damage the 
environment are not seen to be 
condemned, and recurrences effectively 
discouraged are, however, ignored. While 
the reluctance of the regulators in Britain 
to bring prosecutions is in part 
attributable to a culture that avoids 
confrontation to a degree that some 
might regard as excessive, it is
o o '
understandable that they should regard 
proceedings that fail as counter- 
productive.
STRICT LIABILITY
It is clearly wrong in principle that a 
person can be convicted of a criminal 
offence in circumstances where he may 
never have intended the consequences of 
his act or omission, was not negligent, 
and indeed may have done his level best 
to avoid the consequences that 
precipitated the prosecution.
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?
The problem is perhaps most acute 
in circumstances where the separate 
actions of two or more people have
together resulted in a pollution offence, o r 7
and yet it is just such situations that 
increasingly arise. Constructive
o J
collaboration between two or more 
parties is frequently called for, e.g. in the 
duty of care in dealing with waste, the 
discharge of trade effluent to a sewage 
treatment works, or the use of sub- 
contractors to do work that calls for an 
appreciation of all the surrounding 
potential environmental hazards. In such
cases who, if anyone, may be found guilty 
of an offence may well bear little or no 
relation to who was in practice at fault, 
and who should, in an effective system, 
be held at least partly accountable. The 
criminal process is not suited to 
allocating degrees of responsibility.
Thus Global Environmental, a waste 
management company, in responding to a 
charge brought under the Environmental 
Protection Act 1990, s. 33(l)(c), made 
much of the fact that an appreciably more 
serious incident had occurred shortly 
after the one the subject of the charge,
McTay Construction Limited (unreported, 14 
April 1986), one of McTay's sub- 
contractors had polluted a local 
watercourse. The parallel proceedings 
against McTay, as the main contractor, 
were rejected by the court, very largely it 
seems on the ground that if the main 
contractor was liable, then the principal, 
the Greater Manchester Council, should 
have been too. The logic was sound. It is 
the assumption that the Council could 
not be regarded as responsible that is 
questionable, even though it had a major 
hand in determining what was done on 
the site.
and yet no proceedings were taken in that 
second case. The West Yorkshire Waste 
Regulation Authority, then the 
responsible regulator, did not bring a 
prosecution because of the difficulty of 
apportioning responsibility between 
Global and the producer of the waste that 
Global was treating. Each blamed the 
other, and the Authority considered there 
was a severe risk that both parties might 
have made a sufficient case that the other 
was principally responsible, and that both 
would have been acquitted.
The reluctance of the courts to 
convict one of multiple parties was 
exemplified also in National Rivers 
Authority v Welsh Development Agency [1993] 
Env LR 407 where the defendant 
landlord was acquitted (in the writer's 
view wrongly), with harsh words from the 
judge for the prosecuting authority for 
bringing the case against the Agency, 
rather than the polluting tenant. 
Similarly, in North West Water Authority v
PENALTIES
The inappropriateness of the 
criminal law for normal environmental 
regulation appears also from the 
sanctions imposed on a convicted 
defendant. The fine or other penalty is, 
quite properly in the criminal context, 
related in large part to the culpability of 
the defendant. However, this bears no 
necessary relation whatever to the 
environmental consequences of the 
incident, and may throw the burden of 
these on to the public and fail to give 
effect to the polluter pays principle. Even 
to the extent that a fine to some degree 
reflects the severity of an incident, as a 
matter of public policy, the defendant 
cannot seek reimbursement from third 
parties whose own behaviour may have 
contributed to it.
CIVIL REMEDY
Continental European jurisdictions, 
with their separate regimes and courts for
applying administrative law, have not 
been faced with this problem. However 
other common law jurisdictions, notably 
Australia, especially New South Wales, 
and the US, have shown how 
administrative actions can be given effect 
through proceedings in the civil courts. A 
development along comparable lines in 
this country would be highly desirable. 
What is required, in essence, is a system 
of administrative sanctions that, as a 
minimum, would deprive those who fail 
to comply with environmental obligations 
of all profit from their default, coupled 
with an ability to require the polluter 
both to remedy whatever environmental 
harm may have been caused, and also to 
take appropriate steps to minimise the 
chance of a recurrence.
Until very recently, the regulators 
have merely had a right to do necessary 
works, and to recover their costs from 
the relevant person. This has been of 
limited value, given the regulators' 
limited resources to fund such works, 
and particularly so where there is a 
substantial likelihood that they may fail to 
obtain reimbursement. Enforcement 
notices under the Integrated Polluted
o
Control (IPC) regime allow the regulator 
to require work to be done without 
putting public funds at risk, but the 
power only applies to those operating 
processes subject to IPC. Works notices 
may now be served under the Water 
Resources Act 1990, as amended by the 
Environment Act 1995 and remediation 
notices, introduced by Part II of the 
Environment Act 1995 into the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990 will, 
eventually, likewise be available to deal 
with significantly contaminated land. 
Nevertheless these provisions operate 
independently of court proceedings, and 
most can be activated only if the relevant 
regulator chooses to do so. While this 
should undoubtedly be the norm, it is 
anomalous that any person may, in 
England and Wales, institute 
prosecutions for environmental offences 
but yet have no direct influence over 
whether and how administrative 
proceedings are pursued.
PRIVATE ACTIONS
'Citizen suits' have been pioneered in 
the US, being first introduced in 1972 in 
amendments to the Clean Air Act 1993. 
With minor variations, they are now 
provided for in virtually all US 25
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The Environment Agency website prov*
its work, including its State of the EnWrdnmenr KeporfrTnTsnprovTc^W'a"" 
'snapshot look at the pressures on the environment and how the quality of 
the environment has changed over the last twenty-five or so years'.
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environmental legislation. Thus any legal 
person may take such proceedings against 
anyone who is in breach of an 
environmental regulatory requirement, 
seeking a penalty and/or an injunction. 
The defendant may also be a relevant 
enforcing authority being required to 
perform its statutory duties. To avoid 
duplication of proceedings, citizen suits 
may only be executed after the relevant 
regulator has been given suitable notice, 
e.g. of 45 to 60 days, and it has failed to 
bring any proceedings or to pursue them 
diligently.
Statutory maxima are prescribed for 
the civil penalties, usually around 
$25,000 per day of violation. The figure 
corresponds relatively closely to the 
£20,000 generally applicable to most 
environmental offences, when tried 
summarily, but since they may 
accumulate on a daily basis, the actual 
penalties imposed can on occasion be 
very large indeed. For example, in 1995, 
General Motors was reported to have 
agreed a settlement of an action for 
breaches of the Clean Air Act 1993 which 
involved payment of a penalty of $11m, 
an undertaking to carry out a recall and 
refit of certain cars, which would cost 
over $25m and to undertake up to 
$8.7 5m worth of compensatory 
measures to off set excessive emissions 
resulting from the non compliance   a 
total cost of some $45m.
AMERICAN EXAMPLE
The US Environmental Protection 
Agency has issued guidelines on its own 
practice for determining the level of 
penalties it imposes, and these include 
the seriousness of the violation, any 
economic benefit of non-compliance, 
previous violations, and the impact of the 
penalty on the violator.
The use of administrative/civil 
proceedings therefore in no way signifies 
a softer regime. The US Environmental 
Protection Agency has issued guidelines 
on its own practice for determining the 
level of penalties it imposes, and these
include the seriousness of the violation, 
any economic benefit of non- 
compliance, previous violations, and the 
impact of the penalty on the violator. A 
factor the courts take into account, in 
particular, is whether the defendant has 
an environmental management svstem in
O J
place and is operating it properly   a 
strong incentive to have a suitable system.
A feature of particular significance in 
considering the introduction of civil 
actions is the ability in formal 
proceedings to apportion responsibility 
between two or more people who both 
may have been involved in a regulatory 
breach, e.g. a landlord and his tenant, or 
a principal, his contractor and a sub- 
contractor. It is of the essence of citizen 
suits in the US that all relevant parties 
should be involved, to allow a proper 
allocation of liabilities. This enables the 
courts to get away from the sometimes 
arcane arguments as to just who has 
'caused' a pollution incident, and 
whether the defendant can properly 
plead actus novus interveniens and on how 
foreseeable any such intervention should 
be.
In practice, a high proportion of civil 
suits in the US are settled by way of a 
consent decree which, as in the General 
Motors case, may entail not only 
acceptance of a civil penalty, but also 
undertakings to carry out certain specific 
steps to deal with the environmental 
damage and avoid future damage.
o o
Although criminal courts in Britain can 
make compensation orders, these are of 
very limited scope in practice, and would 
be unlikely to include any measures that 
cannot be readily supervised by the court 
directly.
BRITISH SOLUTION
What is called for therefore is a 
tribunal of law, independent of the 
Environment Agency, but no doubt in 
practice operating closely alongside it, 
that would have jurisdiction to impose 
civil sanctions, including in particular 
monetary penalties and mandatory
orders. To gain both the confidence and 
the respect of those coming before it and 
of the public at large, it would have to be1 o '
under the control of a judge or judges 
who had both practical experience in 
environmental law and sufficient 
technical ability and business experience 
to determine effective and relevant 
sanctions. Such a body would also be 
most appropriate for hearing appeals on 
the merits from decisions of the 
Environment Agency which are currently 
subject either to appeals to the Secretary 
of State or else only to judicial review.
CIVIL REMEDY
What is called for therefore is a tribunal 
of law, independent of the Environment 
Agency, but no doubt in practice 
operating closely alongside it, that would 
have jurisdiction to impose civil 
sanctions, including in particular 
monetary penalties and mandatory 
orders.
To establish such a system would 
require decisions on several contentious 
issues, such as the joinder of parties and 
questions of evidence, that cannot be 
adequately discussed here. Nevertheless, 
as experience in other jurisdictions 
clearly shows, the difficulties are not 
insuperable, and the potential benefits 
would fully justify the effort to resolve 
them. In particular, the main impact of 
these proposed changes would be to 
make enforcement of environmental 
regulation through the courts a more 
constructive process than is the case at 
present, which leaves it to a convicted 
defendant to devise, if he can or will, and 
as he sees fit, improvements to his system 
of operation.
These changes would not of course 
make the criminal law redundant; it 
would continue to be a vital weapon in 
the environmental regulator's armoury, 
but would be held in reserve to deal with 
those who act in wilful disregard of the 
law, or are otherwise seriously culpable, 
and not the merely incompetent. @
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